公正研究中的道德信念整合理论
Integrated Theory of Moral Conviction in Justice Research
DOI: 10.12677/AP.2014.44079, PDF, HTML,  被引量 下载: 2,695  浏览: 9,973  国家科技经费支持
作者: 胡金生, 王红霞, 叶 春, 富云露:辽宁师范大学心理学院,大连
关键词: 道德信念独立权威假说试金石假设情绪假说Moral Conviction Authority Independence Hypothesis Litmus Test Hypothesis Emotion Hypothesis
摘要: 不同于“经济人”和“社会人”隐喻的公正研究,道德信念整合理论关注公正判断和公正动机的道德属性,强调个体道德信念具有普世正当、非理智性、非他律性和非容忍性。该理论的核心观点包括道德价值保护模型、权威独立假说、试金石假说和情绪假说。道德信念整合理论在解释利他性惩罚以及拒绝有利不公正时有一定的理论优势,是“经济人”和“社会人”公正取向研究的有益补充。该理论整合了道德发展与社会心理对公正的研究,丰富了公正动机的研究并推动研究主体由当事人向第三方转换。未来,道德信念影响公正判断的机制以及不同取向公正动机如何权变的研究还需加强。
Abstract: Unlike justice research guided by metaphors of “homo economicus” and “homo socialis”, integrated theory of moral conviction (ITMC) concerns about moral attribute of justice judgment and justice motives. ITMC proposes that individual’s moral conviction is of universality, irrationality, autonomy and intolerance. The key assumptions of ITMC include value protection model, the authority independence hypothesis, the litmus test hypothesis and the emotion hypothesis. The theory complements with “homo economicus” and “homo socialis” approaches of justice research, and explains phenomena like altruistic punishment and rejecting advantageous inequity better than other theories. By integrating justice research in moral development and social psychology, ITMC enriches the justice motives research and helps to shift the perspective of research from parties involved to the third party. More emphasis should focus on the mechanism of how moral conviction influences justice judgment and the contingent nature of justice motives in future research.
文章引用:胡金生, 王红霞, 叶春, 富云露 (2014). 公正研究中的道德信念整合理论. 心理学进展, 4(4), 585-593. http://dx.doi.org/10.12677/AP.2014.44079

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