创业板上市公司股权激励与公司绩效相关性 —研究综述与评价
Relationship between Equity Incentive of Listed Companies on Growth Enterprise Market and the Performance of Company—Review and Evaluation
DOI: 10.12677/MSE.2015.43008, PDF, HTML, XML,  被引量 下载: 3,723  浏览: 13,654 
作者: 常启诚：北京邮电大学理学院，北京；高艳：华北电力大学，河北 保定
关键词: 创业板；股权激励；公司绩效；综述；评价；Growth Enterprise Market； Equity Incentive； Performance of the Company； Review； Evaluation
摘要: 现代企业制度的两权分离使得企业的所有者与企业的经营者之间对自身利益的不同诉求成了潜在矛盾。股权激励制度的运用将二者的利益绑定，所有者通过授予经营者一定的股权，使得经营者以股东身份参与企业的管理决策、利益分配、承担经营风险。深交所创业板市场自2009年10月30开板以来，一直作为我国资本市场的有效补充，自2010年起，创业板上市公司不断进行着股权激励的尝试。本文对创业板上市公司股权激励与公司绩效相关性研究的相关文献进行了综述，并对现有研究成果进行评价。
Abstract: Separation of two rights which operates in the modern enterprise system makes their own different profit pursuit between enterprise owners and operators become potential conflicts. The utilization of equity incentive bound interests of the both together. Through using this method, enterprise owners grant certain stock rights to operators and thus make the operators participate in management decisions and interests distribution and undertake operational risks. Since its estab-lishment on October thirtieth 2009, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange GEM market has been used as an effective complement to capital market of China. GEM listed companies has constantly tried to adopt equity incentive system since 2010. This paper reviews relevant literatures at home and abroad, and then gives an evaluation.
文章引用：常启诚, 高艳. 创业板上市公司股权激励与公司绩效相关性 —研究综述与评价[J]. 管理科学与工程, 2015, 4(3): 57-62. http://dx.doi.org/10.12677/MSE.2015.43008

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