考虑参考价格效应的两期闭环供应链Nash均衡博弈

Nash Game in a Two-Period Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Reference Price Effect

摘要: 分别针对制造商回收、零售商回收和第三方回收的三种回收模式，在制造商与零售商Nash均衡博弈情形下构建了基于参考价格效应的两期闭环供应链博弈模型，经求解和比较得到不同回收模式的均衡定价、回收率以及成员利润的数量关系，进而分析参考价格效应产生的影响。研究结果表明：制造商回收模式能实现最优的环保绩效与系统总利润，但该模式下的制造商利润却非最优；零售商回收与第三方回收的优劣取决于回收补贴率；随着参考价格效应的增加，第一期价格和第二期销量提高，第二期价格的增减取决于回收规模参数；回收方的回收动机受到抑制，但所有成员均能从参考价格效应中获益。

Abstract: Nash game models in a two-period closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) system with reference price effect are established under three different kinds of collection modes respectively: manufactur-er-collection, retailer-collection and third-party-collection. The equilibrium prices, collection rates and channel member profits under three modes are derived and compared. Then the im-pacts of reference price effect on CLSC are analyzed. The conclusions show that: manufactur-er-collection mode can maximize the environmental performance and the total profit of CLSC, but the manufacturer cannot realize his own profit maximization. The comparison between retailer-collection and third-party-collection depends on the collection subsidy rate. The reference price effect has a positive impact on the first-period price and the second-period demand in all three modes, while its impact on the second-period price depends upon the collection scale parameter. The increase of the reference price effect discourages the collection enthusiasm of the collector. All the channel members can benefit from the reference price effect.