猪血深加工企业与屠宰场行为博弈中的临界点分析——基于契约型组织模式
Pig Processing Enterprises and Slaughterhouses Behavior of Critical Points in the Game* —The Organizational Model of Contract
摘要: 通过建立监控——违约博弈模型,选择猪肉供应链中的猪血深加工企业与生猪屠宰场两个相邻供应链结点,分析两者间静态与动态博弈关系,利用博弈模型导出双方行为选择的临界点,并以此为核心,展开分析各相关因素对双方博弈行为的影响,为双方在供应链中的行为选择提供参考依据,以促进双方形成互惠共赢、稳定合作的稳定关系,从而优化与完善整条供应链。
Abstract: Selection the adjacent points between pig processing enterprises and slaughterhouse in the porksupply chain, the relationship between dynamic and static game was analyzed by building the supervise defaultgame model. And the critical condition of behavior selection of them was obtained by using supervise gamemodel. And as a core, it optimizes and improves the whole supply chain analyzing the related factors on behaviorof both games for both sides in the supply chain to provide reference for the behavior of choice, in order to promote both the formation of mutually beneficial win-win cooperation, stability and stable relations.
文章引用:陈冶胜, 谭勇, 赵萌. 猪血深加工企业与屠宰场行为博弈中的临界点分析——基于契约型组织模式[J]. 现代管理, 2011, 1(1): 1-6. http://dx.doi.org/10.12677/mm.2011.11001

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