在位第三方卖家面对后进卖家入驻平台时的模式选择
Business Models Choices for Third-Party Sellers Facing Entrants
摘要: 面对后进第三方卖家(后进者)进入,在位第三方卖家(在位者)如何选择合适的入驻模式是关系到其能否在电商平台上持久发展的一个关键问题。当前相关研究只考虑第三方卖家的入驻模式,没有考虑入驻时间差异。基于此,本文构建了一个双寡头垂直差异化竞争模型,研究在位第三方卖家面对后进卖家入驻电商平台时的最优模式选择,并探讨在位第三方卖家限制入驻模式前后的最优策略变化。研究发现:1) 在位者选择代售模式的情况下,若渠道感知差异或真实质量差异较小,后进者选择转售,在位者所获利润最大;若两项差异都较大,后进者选择代售,在位者所获利润最大;2) 在位者选择转售模式的情况下,只在渠道感知差异较小,真实差异较大时,后进者选择转售,在位者所获利润最大;其余情况,后进者选择代售,在位者所获利润最大。此外,在位者限制入驻模式后,若在位者选择代售模式,在渠道感知差异小于真实质量差异时,在位者最优入驻模式范围缩小;若在位者选择转售模式,当后进者选择转售模式时,在位者最优入驻模式范围增大。
Abstract:
Faced with entrance third-party sellers (entrants), the incumbent third party sellers (incumbents) choosing the appropriate model is a key issue related to the sustainable development. Recently, relevant researches only consider the entry models of third-party sellers, but don’t consider the entry time difference. This paper fills the gap by building and analyzing a vertical differentiation competition model. This paper studies the optimal strategies of incumbents facing entrants and discusses the changes of the optimal strategies after the incumbents restrict the business mod-els. The findings are as follows: 1) When incumbents choose the agency model, if the channel perception difference or real quality difference is small and the entrants choose the reselling model, the incumbent gains the maximum profit; If the two difference is large, the entrants choose the agency model, the incumbent gets the maximum profit; 2) When the incumbent chooses reselling model, only when the channel perception difference is small and the real difference is large, the entrants choose the reselling model and the incumbent gets the maximum profit; In other cases, the entrants choose the agency model and the incumbent gets the maximum profit. In addition, after the limitation by the incumbent, when the incumbent chooses the agency model, if the channel perception difference is smaller than the real quality difference, the scope of the incumbent’s optimal business models decreases. When the incumbent chooses the reselling models, if the entrant chooses the reselling model, the scope of incumbent’s optimal business models increases.
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