转型时期行业协会经济自治的影响因素分析——基于广东、浙江两地的经验数据
Investigation of Factors Determining Trade Associations’ Self-Governance in Transition——Based on the Questionnaire Survey in Guangdong and Zhejiang
DOI: 10.12677/MM.2012.23018, PDF, HTML, 下载: 3,197  浏览: 7,835  国家自然科学基金支持
作者: 石碧涛*:东莞理工学院经济贸易系,东莞;张捷:暨南大学经济学院,广州
关键词: 行业协会转型自治二分变量回归Trade Associations; Transition; Self-Governance; Binary Choice Regression
摘要: 文章采用虚拟二分变量(binary dummy regression)方法,通过probit、logit和extreme value三种模型,对影响我国行业协会自治的因素进行回归分析。结果表明:理事单位占会员的比例、协会收入中来源于会费的比例越大,越不利于协会的自治;协会对违规者的惩罚力度、协会的决策程序民主度、政府授权给协会的管理权限越大(多),协会的自治效果越好。其他因素如协会成立的时间长短、协会专职人员的数量多少、协会经费中用于会员支出的比例等均未发现显著影响。
Abstract: This paper employs binary dummy regression, using probit, logit and extreme value to find out the influential factors associated with trade associations’ self-governance. The results show: The larger the tight-ness and the percentage of admission fees and fees from service to members and out-oriented service to trade associations’ total revenue is, the worse do trade associations self-govern; The more powerful the punishment and encouragement measures are, the more democratic the decision-making process is, the more autonomous rights government gives, the better do trade associations self-govern. Moreover, other factors such as the length of trade association’s history, the number of the association’s employers, the percentage of associa-tion’s expenditure for membership to its total expenditure have no significant effect. At last suggestion is given.
文章引用:石碧涛, 张捷. 转型时期行业协会经济自治的影响因素分析——基于广东、浙江两地的经验数据[J]. 现代管理, 2012, 2(3): 101-110. http://dx.doi.org/10.12677/MM.2012.23018

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