柠檬现象的普遍性研究
Researches on Universality of the Lemon Phenomenon
DOI: 10.12677/AAM.2015.42013, PDF, HTML, XML, 下载: 3,154  浏览: 11,042 
作者: 郭 嘉:中山大学数学与计算科学学院,广东 广州
关键词: 柠檬现象非对称信息学随机模拟数学模型Lemon Phenomenon Asymmetric Information Stochastic Simulation Mathematic Model
摘要: 柠檬现象,又称柠檬效应,酸柠檬市场理论,是信息不对称问题的一种形象描述。最初由诺贝尔经济学奖得主Akerlof在1970年提出,其论文《柠檬市场:质量的不确定性和市场机制》也奠定了“非对称信息学”的基础。本文在柠檬市场概念的基础上,采用随机模拟的方法建立简单的数学模型,描述柠檬现象在二手车市场的具体表现,并对模拟结果的数据进行统计分析。再推广到其他领域,分析各领域中的柠檬效应。在最后,总结并简述了部分前人对于不对称信息学理论应用的观点,以及对柠檬现象的对策。
Abstract: As a common phenomenon in the market economy, the Market for Lemons, also called Akerlof Model, precisely describes the problems of quality and uncertainty. This conception was published by George Akerlof in 1970 and his work laid the foundation for Asymmetric Information. Based on the economic conception and interpretation, this paper discusses the Lemon Phenomenon through a mathematic model which is depended on simple stochastic simulation. With the well-established model and the results of data gained from simulation, it is easy to evaluate the concrete performance that the Market for Lemon shows in the second-hand car market. Finally, by extending to other kinds of areas and analyzing various sorts of Lemon Phenomenon, this paper summarizes different perspectives from previous works on Asymmetric Information and puts forward several ways to deal with the situation.
文章引用:郭嘉. 柠檬现象的普遍性研究[J]. 应用数学进展, 2015, 4(2): 96-104. http://dx.doi.org/10.12677/AAM.2015.42013

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