标题:
基于混合战略定价博弈模型的招投标策略分析与对策Analyses and Solutions of Bidding Strategy Base on the Game Theory Model of the Mixed Strategy Pricing
作者:
祁跃东, 代玲, 李存华, 潘文
关键字:
招投标, 混合战略, 古诺模型, 期望价格Tender, Mixed Strategy, Cournot Model, Expectations of Price
期刊名称:
《Modern Management》, Vol.5 No.3, 2015-06-24
摘要:
在招投标过程中，量化供货商的性能价格比是难点。为研究招投标策略，本文研究分析了投标者与招标者、投标者之间形成的博弈模型。针对寡头垄断和市场领导者与跟随者形成了不同期望价格的市场格局，提出了基于古诺模型和混合战略的定价机制。通过现实活动中的有限理性假设对理论模型的修正，提出了招投标活动中相关的策略，克服了招投标出现的某些问题。It is a difficulty to compare the cost performance in tender. In order to research the strategy of tender, the quantitative cost performance comparison is analyzed. A pattern of game theory is formed between the bidders and the tenders; the pricing mechanism is analyzed based on the COUMOT model; the market structure of the oligopoly is formed for the supply of equipment and supplies, and a different expectation of price between the leader and follower shows up. As a result, the pricing according to the mixed strategy is used by the tenders. This article analyses the game pricing strategy based on COUMOT model, and mainly focuses on the modification of theoretical model on account of real activity. On that basis, this article puts forward some corresponding suggestions in view of the previous analysis which is aimed at overcoming the possible problem in bidding.