标题:
上市公司股利政策信息效应研究Research on Information Effects of China’s Listed Companies’ Dividend Policy
作者:
王子豪
关键字:
股利政策, 信息不对称, 公司治理Dividend Policy, Information Asymmetry, Corporate Governance
期刊名称:
《Finance》, Vol.6 No.1, 2016-01-29
摘要:
本文主要基于股利政策的信号传递理论，解释公司股利决策动机是如何在控股股东自身利益最大化与利用股利政策发送信号实现企业价值最大化之间进行选择的，从中发现我国上市公司股利政策的运行规律和机理。采用事件研究法，用股票交易的高频数据考察股利公告前后市场信息不对称的变化。在总结相关结论的基础上给出了政策建议。
Basing on dividend signaling theory, our study explains the motivation of corporate dividend payment. It explains how to choose in controlling shareholders to maximize their own interests and utilization of dividend policy to send signals to maximize the enterprise value. It studies the dividend policy running rule and mechanism of listed companies. By using event study, we choose the high-frequency data of stock trading to explore the change of market information asymmetry before and after dividend announcements. Taken together, our study provides some policy suggestions based on the results.