标题:
“机器换人”补贴方式比较研究—基于广义纳什讨价还价机制Research on Comparison of Financial Subsidy Types for “Replacing Man with Machine”—Based on Generalized Nash Bargaining Scheme
作者:
孙玉卫, 张智聪
关键字:
供应链, 制造业产业升级, 机器换人, 财政补贴决策Supply Chain, Industrial Upgrade of Manufacturing, Replacing Man with Machine, Financial Subsidy Decision-Making
期刊名称:
《Management Science and Engineering》, Vol.5 No.2, 2016-06-21
摘要:
“机器换人”的一种财政补贴方式是政府部门按照设备价格的某一固定比例对设备应用企业进行补贴，另一种则是政府部门按照每台（套）设备可获某一固定资金额度补贴的方式补贴给设备应用企业。本文以广义的纳什讨价还价机制为理论基础，在两种补贴方式下分别建立了设备供应商与应用企业的讨价还价模型，从而考察并比较了两种补贴方式的补贴效果。研究发现，在相同数量补贴资金下，固定额度补贴所引起的购买设备的应用企业数量增加量不会小于固定比例补贴，并且能使得这些应用企业购买设备所获净效益增加量大于固定比例情况下的增加量。
There are two financial subsidy types for “replacing man with machine”, one of which is fixed ratio subsidy that government provides subsidy for equipment buyer by a certain ratio of equipment price, and the other of which is fixed volume subsidy that government provides subsidy for equipment buyer by a specific amount of money. Based on Generalized Nash Bargaining Scheme, bargaining models between equipment supplier and buyer were established respectively under the two subsidy types to investigate and compare the effectiveness of government subsidy. It is found that fixed volume subsidy, under the same amount of subsidy capital, can incentive more equipment purchase and the net benefit of these enterprises increases more than that under fixed ratio subsidy.