标题:
在CBA管办分离背景下利益主体利益分配的演化博弈研究The Study of Benefit Distribution of the Two Stakeholders under the Background of Separation between Government and Organization of CBA League by Using Evolutionary Game Model
作者:
申晨, 刘丹, 郭甜
关键字:
CBA, 管办分离, 演化博弈模型, 复制动态方程CBA, Separation between Government and Organization, Evolutionary Game Model, Replicated Dynamic Equation
期刊名称:
《Advances in Social Sciences》, Vol.5 No.4, 2016-08-15
摘要:
在中国职业篮球联赛管办分离的大背景下，中国篮协和由CBA18家俱乐部老板自发成立的中职联公司成为了CBA联赛中的两个最大的利益主体，如何分配两者之间的利益，促使双方进行合作，已经成为CBA管办分离中的一大难题。本文利用演化博弈模型，构建复制动态方程，找出影响博弈双方策略演化的主要因素，最终为促进双方合作，推动CBA管办分离的正常进行提供理论依据。
Under the background of the separation between government and organization for Chinese Pro-fessional Basketball League, Chinese Basketball Association and a company with 18 CBA club owners become the two largest stakeholders in the CBA League. However, in order to promote the cooperation between the two sides, the way of distributing the benefits has become a major problem in the separation between government and organization. In this paper, we use evolutionary game model to construct the replication dynamic equation and try to find out the main factors that affect the evolution of the strategy of two parties. Ultimately, this finding provides a theoretical evidence for promoting the mutual cooperation of the two sides and the successful separation between government and organization of CBA.