基于非合作博弈的医院EPC招投标竞争机制研究

Non-Cooperative Game Analysis for the Bidding Competition Mechanism of EPC Led by Hospital

摘要: 合同能源管理是推进医院节能改造的有效途径。为分析节能公司与各方的互动关系及其报价行为对各方收益和策略的影响，并解决医院合同能源管理项目招投标过程中存在的问题，本文构建了节能公司与不同参与方串谋的Stackberg博弈模型和两家节能服务公司公平竞价的Bertrand博弈模型。研究发现：在Stackberg博弈模型中，节能公司1的怠工程度对各方收益影响显著，地方政府和医院处于劣势，而节能公司2收益相对稳定。具体来说，节能公司1与地方政府合谋时，随着节能公司1怠工程度的加大，医院策略受限，地方政府收益快速下降；节能公司1与医院合谋时，随着节能公司1怠工程度的加大，地方政府收益下降至零，而两家节能公司收益稳定。地方政府试图通过监管手段降低节能公司的怠工行为，但节能公司可能通过串通规避惩罚；节能公司1与地方政府合谋时，医院策略受限，地方政府收益可能快速下降；与医院合谋时，地方政府收益下降至零，而两家节能公司收益稳定；项目所需的生产要素投入量、医院的节能收益系数对各方收益的影响因合谋关系而异。在Bertrand模型中，节能公司的竞争强度与均衡价格呈负相关，单位工作成本与均衡价格成正比，地方政府的补贴与均衡价格成反比。医院的单位购买成本上限与节能公司1的报价成反比，与节能公司2的报价成正比。节能公司1因较低的单位成本和较高的竞争强度，在市场中更具价格优势。这对医院和地方政府维护招标秩序、改善自身收益具有参考价值。

Abstract: Energy performance contracting is an effective way to promote energy-saving renovations in hospitals. To analyze the interaction between an energy-saving company and different participants and the impact of companies’ bidding behavior, and solve the problems in the bidding of hospital energy performance contracting projects, this paper constructs a Stackberg game model of collusion between an energy-saving company and different participants and a Bertrand game model of fair bidding between two companies. The research finds that in the Stackberg game model, the degree of shirking of energy-saving Company 1 has a significant impact on the profits of all parties. The local government and the hospital are at a disadvantage, while the profit of energy-saving Company 2 is relatively stable. To be specific, when energy-saving Company 1 colludes with the local government, with the increase of the degree of shirking of energy-saving Company 1, the hospital’s strategy is restricted, and the local government’s profit may decline rapidly. When energy-saving Company 1 colludes with the hospital, with the increase of the degree of shirking of energy-saving Company 1, the local government’s profit drops to zero, while the profits of two companies are stable. The local government attempts to reduce these companies’ shirking behavior through regulatory means, but energy-saving companies may collude to avoid punishment. When energy-saving Company 1 colludes with the local government, the hospital’s strategy is restricted, and the local government’s profit may decline rapidly. When energy-saving Company 1 colludes with the hospital, the local government’s profit drops to zero, while the profits of the two companies are stable. The required input of production factors for the project and the energy-saving benefit coefficient of the hospital have different impacts on the profits of all parties in different collusion relationships. In the Bertrand model, the competition intensity of energy-saving companies is negatively correlated with their equilibrium prices, the unit work cost is directly proportional to the equilibrium price, and the local government subsidy is inversely proportional to the equilibrium price. The upper limit of the hospital’s unit purchase cost is inversely proportional to the price quoted by Company 1 and directly proportional to the price quoted by Company 2. Energy-saving Company 1 has a greater price advantage in the market due to its lower unit cost and higher competition intensity. These conclusions have reference value for hospitals and local governments to maintain the bidding order and improve their own profits.