康德自由问题的循环论证考察

An Examination of the Circular Argument in Kant’s Theory of Freedom

摘要: 自由与道德法则的关系是康德实践哲学的难题，而循环论证的指控则是理解这一关系的枢纽。通过回溯康德从《纯粹理性批判》到《实践理性批判》的建构历程，康德以理性事实学说将自由从理论演绎的对象转化为实践意识中被给予的要素，从而在相当程度上规避了形式逻辑的恶性循环。然而，这一策略并未真正消灭循环，而是将其转移至一个更为隐蔽的层面，即将纯粹理性的实践性何以自足的前件问题加以悬置，最终使得整个论证悬系于理性无法解释的境域之上。康德的自由论证因而在理论上的可解释性与实践上的被给予性之间形成了不可消解的结构性张力。

Abstract: The relationship between freedom and moral law is a challenge in Kant’s practical philosophy, and the accusation of circular reasoning is the key to understanding this relationship. By retracing Kant’s construction process from the “Critique of Pure Reason” to the “Critique of Practical Reason”, Kant transformed freedom from the object of theoretical deduction into an element given in practical consciousness, thereby largely avoiding the vicious circle of formal logic. However, this strategy did not truly eliminate the circularity but shifted it to a more concealed level, namely, suspending the preconditions for the self-sufficiency of the practicality of pure reason, ultimately making the entire argument hinge on a realm that rationality cannot explain. Thus, Kant’s argument on freedom forms an irreducible structural tension between the theoretical explainability and the practical givenness.