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(法)贝尔特朗•维尔热里. 论痛苦[M]. 李元华, 译. 杭州: 浙江人民出版社, 2003: 31-32.

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  • 标题: 叔本华痛苦观析论An Analysis and Discussion of the Schopenhauer’s View of Pain

    作者: 闫顺利, 孙佳慧

    关键字: 意志, 痛苦, 虚无, 肯定, 价值Will, Pain, Nothingness, Affirmation, Value

    期刊名称: 《Advances in Philosophy》, Vol.5 No.3, 2016-09-13

    摘要: 叔本华痛苦观具有世界观、人生观和价值观三重意蕴。以意志作本体说明世界亦表达了一种哲学观;生命意志标示着人是其所是,表现为无休无止的意欲冲动,规定了人的痛苦本质,从而不可避免地陷入虚无。叔本华鲜明地表达了痛苦对人生的积极意义,揭明了“向死而生”机理;痛苦是乐观主义的一幅有效解毒剂,痛苦本身并无价值,而是生命使痛苦有价值,痛苦的价值在于激发出新的价值。 The Schopenhauer’s view of pain has three meanings that are world view, philosophy and sense of worth. Treating the will as noumenon also expresses a view of philosophy; the will of life marks “man is what it is”, showing the endless impulse of desire, and it specifies the nature of human’s pain; thereby it inevitably falls into nothingness. Schopenhauer expressed the positive significance of pain to life clearly, and exposed the mechanism of “borning to die”; pain is an effective antidote of optimism, and the pain itself has no value. But life made the pain worthwhile, and the value of pain is to stimulate new value.

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