标题:
城市存量土地再开发理论模型构建—基于动态博弈视角Theoretical Model Construction of Urban Land Re-Development—Based on Dynamic Game Theory
作者:
王平, 张水清
关键字:
城市存量土地开发, 土地收储模式, 自行开发模式, 动态博弈模型, 纳什均衡Urban Land Re-Development, Land Reserve Mode, Self Development Mode, Dynamic Game Theory, Nash Equilibrium
期刊名称:
《Advances in Social Sciences》, Vol.5 No.4, 2016-09-26
摘要:
城市土地再开发对提高城镇土地集约节约利用水平具有重要意义。通过对土地收储模式和自行开发模式的流程结构、权利、利益与风险演化的量化分析，构建了基于动态博弈视角的城市存量土地再开发理论模型。结论如下：1) 在规划信息不确定条件下，博弈模型将会形成两个纳什均衡；2) 从“占劣策略”角度，只要在“招拍挂”政策下交易成本够高，就会使均衡行动变成“严格占劣”的策略，使地方政府完全采用自主开发政策；3) 存量土地的增值收益分成比例也是重要因素，若分配比例过小，会使得均衡行动变为“严格占劣”的策略，使地方政府完全没有激励采用自主开发政策；4) 最终模型的均衡结果和最优存量土地开发模式依赖于相关单位价格变量与决策参数之间的互动变化。
Urban land re-development is of great significance to improve the level of urban land intensive utilization. Based on the quantitative analysis of land reserve mode and self development mode of land process structure, rights, interests and evolution of risk, a theoretical model of urban land re-development based on dynamic game theory was constructed. Conclusions are as follows: 1) Under the uncertainty of the planning information, the game model will form two Nash equilibrium; 2) From dominated strategy perspective, as long as the policy transaction costs are high enough, a strictly dominated strategy would be made; local governments would adopt the policy of independent development; 3) Revenue sharing ratio of stock land is also an important factor. If the ratio is too small, a strictly dominated strategy would also be made; the local government has no incentive to adopt the policy of independent development; 4) The equilibrium results of the final model and the optimal stock land development model depend on the interaction between the unit price and the decision parameters.