标题:
我国公共政策执行中的央地利益博弈研究综述The Epicenter of Interest Games between the Central Government and the Local Governments in the Process of China’s Public Policy Implementation
作者:
周媛
关键字:
公共政策, 央地利益, 博弈Public Policy; Central Interests; Game
期刊名称:
《Modern Management》, Vol.3 No.3, 2013-07-19
摘要:
在政策执行的过程中，“上有政策、下有对策”的行为直接导致了政策执行的偏差，造成了公共资源的极大浪费和对公共利益的损害。已有文献研究指出，地方政府在政策执行过程中存在着政策替换、政策附加和政策敷衍等扭曲现象，而利益矛盾和法制缺陷是导致央地博弈的根本原因，因此，利益整合和制度创新是解决“上有政策、下有对策”问题的关键。基于学术界已有的研究成果，本文从政策执行中的央地利益博弈表现、央地利益博弈缘由以及解决“上有政策、下有对策”问题的路径探析等几个方面进行了文献梳理，并做出简要的评析。In the process of policy implementation, there are some policy makers who behave wrongly di-rectly resulted in the deviation of policy implementation. This action causes a huge waste of public resources and the damage to the public interest. The existing literatures have been pointed out that, in the process of policy implementation, the local governments have distorted phenomenon such as policy replacement, policy attached, policy elaborated and so on. Interest contradictions and defects of legal system are the root causes of the interest games between the central government and the local government. As a result, interest integra-tion and institutional innovation are the keys to solve the problem that the higher authorities have policies but the localities have their countermeasures. Based on the existing academic research, this paper makes a litera-ture review and brief comments on several performances from the interest games’ performance and reasons between the central government and the local government and the countermeasures to solve the problem that the higher authorities have policies but the localities have their countermeasures.