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刘燕斌, 李明甫. 国外企业高管薪酬研究与借鉴(下)[J]. 中国劳动保障, 2009, 3: 61-62.

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  • 标题: 高管层股权激励约束问题研究Study about the Issue of Executives Equity Incentives Restriction

    作者: 方天堃, 赵成

    关键字: 股权激励, 高管辞职套现, 股权激励约束Equity Incentives; Executives Resign Cash; Equity Incentives Restriction

    期刊名称: 《Modern Management》, Vol.1 No.2, 2011-07-20

    摘要: 股权激励是一种对高管进行有效的长期激励方式,借此调动高管积极性,充分发挥高管的才能帮助公司更好的发展,使得高管与公司共赢。但是面对暴利的诱惑,一些高管选择了辞职套现。本文介绍了我国高管层股权激励现状,分析了高管层股权激励中存在的问题及问题产生的原因。结论认为,股权激励制度应当注重约束与激励并存,对高管层股权激励约束的问题,提出一些针对性的改善建议。 Equity incentives for executives is an effective long-term incentives method, which to mobilize the enthusiasm of senior executives, and executives can give full play to help companies develop better, making the win-win situation with the company and executives. But faced with the temptation of huge profits, some executives have chosen to resign cash. This article describes the status of executives’ equity incentives, ana-lyzed some problems of executives’ equity incentives, and made some improvement proposal for executives’ equity incentive restriction.

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