MM  >> Vol. 6 No. 3 (June 2016)

    政府控制、公司治理与企业避税
    Government Control, Corporate Governance and Corporate Tax Avoidance

  • 全文下载: PDF(522KB) HTML   XML   PP.82-91   DOI: 10.12677/MM.2016.63011  
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作者:  

覃志刚:厦门大学经济学院,福建 厦门;
刘 娜:深圳科技工业园集团有限公司,广东 深圳

关键词:
政府控制公司治理企业避税Government Control Corporate Governance Corporate Tax Avoidance

摘要:

在我国的制度背景下,国有经济占相当大的比重。政府主导的市场经济改革决定了我国特有的经济“双轨制”,最终决定了上市公司受不同实际控制人的影响。随着现代企业制度的不断发展,两权分离导致公司治理问题日益突显。本文以2007~2013年中国A股上市公司为研究样本,首先实证分析了政府控制、公司治理结构对企业避税的影响,然后根据实际控制人性质将上市公司细分为中央政府、省级政府、市级政府、县级政府及非政府控制五种类型,研究不同政府层级控制对避税的影响作用,并对比分析了不同实际控制人下公司治理对避税行为的影响效应。研究发现:相比非政府控制的企业,政府控制的企业避税行为更加保守,尤其是中央政府和省级政府控制的企业。监事会有效的监管可以抑制企业避税行为,股权集中度对避税是正向作用。本文的分析为深入探讨政府控制、公司治理与企业避税的关系提供新视角。

Under the background of Chinese special system, state-owned economy accounts for a large proportion. The market economy reform led by the government determines our unique dual-track economy system, and it finally determines that listed companies are subject to dif-ferent actual controllers. With the ever-developed modern enterprise system, the separation of ownership and management right leads to corporate governance issue increasingly prominent. Using Chinese listed companies during 2007-2013, this paper firstly studies the influence of government control, corporate governance on tax avoidance behavior and then divides the listed companies into five kinds according to their controlling characteristic: cen-tral-government controlling, province- government controlling, city-government controlling, county-government controlling and non- government controlling and empirically analyses the impact on tax avoidance of different government-levels controlling. The results suggest that compared to non-government controlled companies, the tax avoidance behavior of government controlled companies are less aggressive, especially central-government and prov-ince-government controlled companies. Effective regulation of board of supervisors can reduce corporate tax avoidance and ownership concentration has a positive effect on tax avoidance. This paper provides new perspectives for further analyzing the relationship between govern-ment control, corporate governance and tax avoidance.

文章引用:
覃志刚, 刘娜. 政府控制、公司治理与企业避税[J]. 现代管理, 2016, 6(3): 82-91. http://dx.doi.org/10.12677/MM.2016.63011

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