管理科学与工程  >> Vol. 5 No. 2 (June 2016)

家族企业政治联系、税收征管与避税行为研究
Research on Family Firms’ Political Connection, Tax Administration and Tax Avoidance

DOI: 10.12677/MSE.2016.52012, PDF, HTML, XML, 下载: 1,521  浏览: 3,385  国家科技经费支持

作者: 颜淑姬:浙江工商大学财会学院,浙江 杭州

关键词: 家族企业政治联系税收征管避税Family Firm Political Connection Tax Administration Tax Avoidance

摘要: 家族企业的高税负导致偷漏税案例频繁发生,引起社会的高度关注。是什么原因导致这种现象呢?在转轨经济、治理转型下我国家族企业尚处于政治依赖阶段,政企关系是影响企业避税的重要因素,但现有研究对此涉及较少。本文以2008~2011年的2818个家族上市公司为样本,考察政治联系、税收征管与家族企业避税之间的关系。研究发现,政治联系的存在性并不对家族企业避税产生显著影响,但政治联系的强弱却对家族企业避税产生了显著的正向影响,税收征管能有效约束家族企业利用政治联系而进行的非合理避税。
Abstract: Family firms’ tax evasion cases occur frequently due to high tax burden. This causes social concern including academia. What’s the reason? Family firms which are in the economic and governance transformation stage are still relying on political connections; political connection is an important factor which influences family firms’ tax avoidance. But the existing research rarely involves. This paper takes 2818 family listed companies from year 2008 to 2011 as sample, examines the rela-tionship among political connection, tax administration and family firms’ tax avoidance. The study shows that political connection’s existence has no significant impact on family firm’s tax avoidance, but the strength of political connections has a positive significant impact on family firm’s tax avoidance. And tax administration can effectively constraint family firms’ non reasonable tax avoidance by means of political connections.

文章引用: 颜淑姬. 家族企业政治联系、税收征管与避税行为研究[J]. 管理科学与工程, 2016, 5(2): 103-111. http://dx.doi.org/10.12677/MSE.2016.52012

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