间接互惠机制促进合作进化的理论评述
Indirect Reciprocity Mechanism Promotes the Evolution of Cooperation
DOI: 10.12677/AP.2016.611149, PDF, HTML, XML, 下载: 1,821  浏览: 2,378 
作者: 魏 纯：天津师范大学，天津 ；戴斌荣：盐城师范学院，江苏 盐城
关键词: 间接互惠；合作；名誉机制；形象计分策略；名声策略；信息评估；Indirect Reciprocity； Cooperation； Reputation Mechanism； Image Scoring Strategy； Standing Strategy； Information Assessment
摘要: 动物和人类世界存在广泛的合作现象，这些现象很难用物竞天择，适者生存的进化观点解释。1986年Alexander提出间接互惠模型解释大规模的合作现象，基于该模型下的名誉机制、形象计分策略、名声策略等在解释合作上都具有进化稳定性。在对信息的依赖上，间接互惠的研究从对个体信息可被完全观察，开始转向信息有限和不完整观察的领域。随着网络科技和新媒体等的不断发展，信息背景变得更为复杂，信息量更加庞大，信息渠道更为广泛，同时信息真实性却存在风险。因此，间接互惠的名誉机制对合作的解释力度需考虑新的信息背景，此外本土化研究和跨学科间的合作研究也尤为重要。
Abstract: There is a wide range of cooperation between animal and human society, which is difficult to explain in the perspective of natural selection and survival of the fittest evolutionary. In 1986, Alexander proposed the concept of indirect reciprocity to explain the large-scale cooperation phenomenon. Thence, researchers have investigated various strategies, such as the reputation mechanism, the image scoring strategy and the standing strategy based on the indirect reciprocity theory. In reliance on information, the study of indirect reciprocity started from the transparent individual information, turning to the limited information and incomplete observation research areas now. With the development of Internet and new media, there are some new characteristics of in-formation: The amount of information is huge, the channels are more widely, the authenticity of information is with potential risk and the background of information is more complex. Therefore, when we use the model of reputation and indirect reciprocity to explain the cooperation, we should consider the new background of information. Meanwhile, the local studies and researches across disciplines are also very important.
文章引用：魏纯, 戴斌荣 (2016). 间接互惠机制促进合作进化的理论评述. 心理学进展, 6(11), 1183-1191. http://dx.doi.org/10.12677/AP.2016.611149

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