ASS  >> Vol. 6 No. 5 (May 2017)

    所有权性质、资本结构与企业涉足房地产绩效
    Ownership Nature, Capital Structure and the Performance of the Enterprises Involved in Real Estate

  • 全文下载: PDF(448KB) HTML   XML   PP.560-565   DOI: 10.12677/ASS.2017.65077  
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作者:  

杨 川:中国石油大学,北京

关键词:
涉足房地产企业绩效所有权性质资本结构Involve in Real Estate The Performance of Enterprise Ownership Nature Capital Structure

摘要:

本文选取了2001-2014年间的244家多元化经营涉足房地产领域的非房地产企业作为研究样本,实证检验了所有权性质和资本结构对这些企业涉房绩效的影响。结果发现:国有企业的涉房绩效低于民营企业,国有企业在房地产行业的优势在企业涉房的短期中并没有表现出来;银行借款水平和企业涉房绩效呈负相关关系,商业信用与企业涉房绩效呈正相关关系。由于房地产项目融资主要依赖银行借款,非房地产公司在进入房地产行业时,高银行借款水平不利于企业对房地产项目的经营,存在“挤出效应”,对企业的绩效产生负方向的影响,而商业信用主要对企业产生“治理效应”和“信号传递效应”,对企业涉房绩效产生正向影响。

This article selected 244 non-real-estate enterprises which involved into real estate during 2001 to 2014 as the research sample, and tested the relationship between the ownership nature, capital structure and the performance of the enterprises involved in real estate. The conclusion is that: the performance of the state-owned enterprises involved in real estate is lower than private enterprises, bank loan has a negative correlation with the performance of the enterprises involved in real estate, business credit has a positive correlation with the performance of the enterprises involved in real estate. A high bank loan level has crowding-out effect on the performance of the enterprises involved in real estate, business credit effects the performance of the enterprises involved in real estate by the effect of governance and signaling effect.

文章引用:
杨川. 所有权性质、资本结构与企业涉足房地产绩效[J]. 社会科学前沿, 2017, 6(5): 560-565. https://doi.org/10.12677/ASS.2017.65077

参考文献

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