电力系统最小虚假数据攻击向量的建模与分析

Model Building and Analysis of Minimal False-Data Attack Vector Launched on Power System

摘要: 本文提出了一种电力系统最小虚假数据攻击向量的建模方法。这种方法以被攻击电网的局部子环网为对象，以其节点注入功率的改变量最小为目标函数，以边界节点状态量不变和出现线路阻塞以及节点功率平衡为约束条件，建立虚假数据攻击向量的数学模型。用这种方法得到的攻击向量篡改局部电网检测数据后，全电网仍然满足节点功率平衡约束、自然躲过传统状态估计的检测，且虚假线路阻塞经过安全校正系统的调节会使电网陷入真正不安全状态，从而达到攻击目的。仿真结果表明，本文方法生成的攻击向量不仅有效、而且易于获取。

Abstract: A model for building minimal false-data attack vector launched on power systems is proposed in this paper. It is based on a local looped sub-network. The model’s objective function is minimizing the changes in bus injection powers. The model’s constraints include that the values of border state variables remain unchanged; a line congestion occurs and bus power balance equations. It is thus an optimization problem. Adding the attack vector produced by this model to actual measurements from the local looped sub-network gives a false-data attack to the power system. In this way, all bus power balance equations are still satisfied for the whole grid. As a result, the false- data attack naturally avoids the check from power system state estimation software. The false line congestion will lead the security correction system to action that will place the power system on a true not secure state, achieving the aim of an attack. Simulation results show that the attack vector produced by the proposed model is not only effective but easy to achieve.