子网络交叉口信号设计博弈分析
Game Theoretical Intersection Signal Design of Transportation Subnetwork
DOI: 10.12677/ORF.2017.74015, PDF, HTML, XML, 下载: 1,137  浏览: 4,167 
作者: 檀朝武:上海海事大学交通运输学院,上海;张小宁:同济大学经济与管理学院,上海
关键词: 交通网络信号设计子网博弈Transportation Network Signal Timing Subnetwork Game Theory
摘要: 实际中的一个交通网络涵盖不同的区域,每个信号灯的设计者只负责某个区域内的网络交通运行。这种信号灯的设计只是针对子网的,而且不同的区域管理者存在着相互竞争的关系。本文建立这种子网络交叉口信号设计博弈模型,研究分析不同区域间信号设计的博弈行为。运用运筹学方法,将交通子网络上的信号灯设计问题表达为带有用户均衡约束的网络优化问题(TNO-UEC),也称为一个领导者–跟随者博弈。算例分析表明,将子网分开进行信号设计与整体同时设计,得到的解是不一样的。
Abstract: In reality, a transportation network covers different regions. A designer is only responsible for a subnetwork during this region. In this case, signal timing is only for a subnetwork, and managers of different regions compete with each other. In this paper, a subnetwork based signal timing method is established, and the game theoretical behavior among different regions is studied. Applying operational research method, the signal timing problem based on subnetwork is described into a network design problem with user equilibrium constraint, namely the leader-follower game. Numerical example shows that different solutions are obtained when signals are designed based on parallel subnetworks, compared with the integrated signal timing on the whole network.
文章引用:檀朝武, 张小宁. 子网络交叉口信号设计博弈分析[J]. 运筹与模糊学, 2017, 7(4): 148-151. https://doi.org/10.12677/ORF.2017.74015

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