考虑消费者屏蔽行为的劝说型广告投放策略
Delivery Strategy of Persuasive Advertisements Based on Ad-Avoidance Behaviors of Consumers
DOI: 10.12677/ECL.2020.94011, PDF,    国家社会科学基金支持
作者: 张舒俐, 王长军*:东华大学旭日工商管理学院,上海
关键词: 劝说型广告贝叶斯说服广告屏蔽Persuasive Advertising Bayesian Persuasion Ad-Avoidance
摘要: 网络和通信技术的发展使得消费者在面对大量广告的干扰时,能够采取相关措施屏蔽广告。本文致力于从广告商的角度出发,基于贝叶斯劝说理论研究考虑消费者屏蔽行为的劝说型广告的最优投放策略。为此,分别构建了无法辨别和能够辨别消费者屏蔽的劝说广告模型,并对两种模型下广告商的最优收益进行了对比分析。研究得出,合理运用消费者辨别技术能为广告商带来更多的利润,然而,辨别消费者屏蔽技术的投入并不总是最优的,当所需投入成本过高时,无法辨别消费者的广告投放策略反而最优。
Abstract: The advanced network and communication technologies enable consumers to take relevant measures to block the interference of a large number of advertisements. From the perspective of advertisers and based on Bayesian persuasion theory, this paper focuses on studying the optimal delivery of persuasive advertisements that can identify consumer screening technology. Therefore, the theoretical models of persuasive advertising that cannot identify and can identify consumer screening are constructed respectively. On this basis, the optimal income of advertisers under the two models are compared and analyzed. The results show that reasonable use of consumer screening technology can bring more profits to advertisers. However, the investment in consumer screening technology is not always optimal. When the required investment cost is too high, the advertising strategy that cannot identify consumer screening technology becomes optimal instead.
文章引用:张舒俐, 王长军. 考虑消费者屏蔽行为的劝说型广告投放策略[J]. 电子商务评论, 2020, 9(4): 95-105. https://doi.org/10.12677/ECL.2020.94011

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