控制权配置与财务报告舞弊：制约还是放纵

Allocation of Control Rights and Financial Report Fraud: Restricting or Indulging

摘要: 控制权配置作为公司治理因素的核心环节，其模式的划分并未形成定论。本文以财务报告舞弊作为研究切入点，研究控制权配置对上市公司的财务报告舞弊是有着制约还是放纵作用。研究发现：第一，面临财务困境的公司更容易实施财务报告舞弊；第二，不同控制权配置模式下上市公司发生财务报告舞弊的状况有很大差别，股东控制型这一控制权配置模式会放纵公司实施财务报告舞弊。第三，特定控制权配置模式对财务报告舞弊的影响超过财务困境。在我国资本市场上，财务报告舞弊的影响因素中公司治理因素更为主要，作为公司治理当中的核心环节控制权配置更是尤为重要。本研究主要有以下三方面的创新：第一，本文对于控制权配置模式的划分考虑了股东、经理层和董事会在控制权配置过程中的具体角色，将控制权配置划分为股东控制型、股东控制董事会监督型、经理层控制型、经理层控制董事会监督型四种控制权配置模式。第二，本研究验证了我国的资本市场背景下财务困境与财务报告舞弊的关系，并对中国上市公司财务困境判别阈值选取进行了有益的尝试。第三，本研究将影响财务报告舞弊的两大因素(公司特征因素和公司治理因素)放在同一个框架下进行研究，以比较两类因素的作用强弱。

Abstract: As the key link of corporate governance, scholars have not reached consensus on the dividing me-thod of allocation of control rights. The paper investigates the effects of allocation of control rights on financial report fraud: restricting or indulging. Research findings are as follows: First, the listed company which is faced with financial distress is more inclined to implement financial report fraud. Second, the allocation of control rights twists the relationship between financial distress and financial report fraud. Specific allocation of control rights’ mode such as shareholder control will indulge company’s financial report fraud. Last but not the least, in Chinese capital market, corporate governance is the most important factor in financial report fraud. As the core part of corporate governance, the allocation of control rights is particularly important. There are three main innovations in this study: First, based on the consideration of shareholders, managers and the board of directors’ role in allocation of control rights, the paper divides allocation of control rights into four modes: shareholders control, shareholders control as the board of directors supervises, managers control, managers control as the board of directors supervises. Second, this study verifies the relationship between the capital market background, financial distress and financial report fraud in China and makes useful attempt of choosing the threshold of financial distress judgment model. Third, this study puts corporate characteristics and corporate governance factors in the same framework. The study finds that the specific control allocation mode has more impact on financial report fraud than financial distress.