论穆勒对功利主义的发展与辩护——以《功利主义》为中心

On Mill’s Development and Defense of Utilitarianism—Centered on Utilitarianism

摘要: 《功利主义》作为穆勒功利主义思想的代表作，集中呈现了其对边沁传统功利主义的修正与理论突破。穆勒通过提出幸福存在质的差别，将心灵快乐与肉体快乐区分，赋予幸福层次化的价值内涵，完善了“最大幸福原则”的伦理建构。这一创新不仅回应了“功利主义是猪的哲学”的批评，更通过强调心灵快乐的崇高性，为功利主义注入人文深度。此外，穆勒在书中直面反对者对幸福不可实现性、道德评价单一化等质疑，指出对功利主义的偏见多源于概念误读与伦理困境的片面归咎，为功利主义做了辩护。尽管穆勒未能完全摆脱功利主义作为后果论的局限，但其思想仍具现代启示，其功利主义思想既是西方伦理学史上的重要坐标，也在当代持续启发着对良善生活的思考。

Abstract: As the representative work of John Stuart Mill’s utilitarian thought, Utilitarianism encapsulates his revision and theoretical advancement of the Benthamite tradition. By introducing a qualitative distinction among pleasures—differentiating mental from bodily pleasures—Mill enriched the ethical framework of the “greatest happiness principle” with a hierarchical conception of well-being. This innovation not only addressed criticisms branding utilitarianism as a “philosophy for swine,” but also endowed the theory with a humanistic depth by underscoring the superiority of intellectual pleasures. Furthermore, Mill directly confronts objections concerning the attainability of happiness and the supposed reductionism of moral evaluation, arguing that many critiques stem from conceptual misunderstandings and a partial attribution of ethical dilemmas to utilitarianism. While Mill’s account does not fully escape the limitations inherent to consequentialism, his contributions remain intellectually significant. His version of utilitarianism serves as both a landmark in the history of Western moral philosophy and an enduring source of reflection on the nature of the good life.