卡尔纳普《世界的逻辑构造》的还原论逻辑

The Reductionist Logic in Carnap’s “The Logical Structure of the World”

摘要: 卡尔纳普作为经验主义、逻辑实证主义者的代表人物之一，坚持还原论在经验主义中可以从两个方面作为根本的方法论，一是对所有的科学概念进行还原，二是作为操作路径实现科学概念的统合。他在《世界的逻辑构造》一书中构建了自己的还原论体系，实现逻辑实证主义消解形而上学的根本目标，清除语言造成科学中的混乱。他以现象主义为基础，使用逻辑定义和准分析两种方法论，但在现象主义面临的困难下转向物理主义。尽管卡尔纳普努力尝试不断完善理论，但其中依然存在无法弥合的矛盾。这种还原论尝试的失败，为哲学和科学理论的发展提供了经验和借鉴。

Abstract: As one of the representative figures of empiricism and logical positivism, Carnap insisted that reductionism could serve as a fundamental methodology in empiricism from two aspects: one is to reduce all scientific concepts, and the other is to achieve the integration of scientific concepts as an operational path. In his book “The Logical Structure of the World”, he constructed his own reductionist system, achieving the fundamental goal of logical positivism to dissolve metaphysics and eliminate the confusion caused by language in science. Based on phenomenalism, he employed two methodological approaches: logical definition and quasi-analysis, but turned to physicalism in the face of the difficulties faced by phenomenalism. Despite Carnap’s efforts to constantly improve the theory, there are still irreconcilable contradictions within it. The failure of this reductionist attempt provided experience and reference for the development of philosophical and scientific theories.