直播带货中“全网最低价”条款的竞争损害与反垄断应对

Competition Damage and Anti-Monopoly Countermeasures of the “Lowest Price of the Whole Network” Clause in Live Broadcast Delivery

摘要: 直播电商的蓬勃发展使“全网最低价”条款从一种营销策略，演变为头部主播锁定流量、品牌方换取曝光的核心竞争工具。该条款在性质上属于平台最惠国待遇条款，在直播电商特有的多边市场生态中，其竞争损害效应被进一步放大。本文深入剖析了主播、MCN机构、平台与品牌方之间的复杂博弈，揭示了“全网最低价”条款如何通过价格锁定、市场封锁与促成共谋等方式，扭曲市场竞争机制并最终损害消费者长远福利。结合国内外规制经验，本文提出应构建一个契合直播业态的反垄断分析框架，并从事前规制与事后执法两个层面，提出更具建设性与可操作性的制度完善建议。

Abstract: The rapid growth of live-streaming e-commerce has transformed the “lowest price guarantee” clause from a marketing strategy into a core competitive tool for top streamers to lock in traffic and for brands to secure exposure. This clause essentially functions as a platform’s most-favored-nation treatment clause. Within the unique multilateral market ecosystem of live-streaming e-commerce, its detrimental effects on competition are further amplified. This paper delves into the intricate dynamics among hosts, MCN agencies, platforms, and brands, revealing how the “lowest price guarantee” clause distorts market competition through price fixing, market foreclosure, and collusion, ultimately undermining consumers’ long-term welfare. Drawing on domestic and international regulatory experiences, this paper proposes establishing an antitrust analysis framework tailored to the livestreaming industry. It offers more constructive and actionable recommendations for institutional improvements at both ex ante regulatory and ex post enforcement levels.