超越连续性与主观化：康德时间概念的廓清与辩护

Beyond Continuity and Subjectivization: Clarification and Defense of Kant’s Concept of Time

摘要: 在这一篇关于康德先验感性论里的时间概念的论文中，第一部分我将廓清康德时间概念的基本内容，并将其与亚里士多德、奥古斯丁的时间概念相比较，通过阐述亚里士多德时间观中无法解决无数最小的单位时间的接续问题、奥古斯丁时间观中时间的主观化问题，澄清康德时间概念作为先天直观形式，连续性问题在直观下是不存在的，即只要直观是连续的，时间作为先天直观形式就同步地发挥作用。其次，先天直观形式不同于现象，其无所谓连续或断裂。以及时间的经验实在性和先验观念性确保了时间具有主观中的客观性。避免了亚里士多德与奥古斯丁时间概念中的连续性问题与主观化问题。第二部分我将通过介绍特兰德伦堡断裂这一哲学史上著名的对于康德时空观的反驳，对康德的论证进行重塑，试图揭示康德时间概念中忽略了预设关系不等同于包含关系，直观是否能由时空推导出来并不能建立在时空作为直观的预设这一前提上。也就是说，时空的直观性质的逻辑根基并不牢固，它不是自明的。直观有可能是从时空中推导而出的，但也无法排除直观从其他事物那里推导出来的可能性。并在最后站在为康德哲学辩护的立场上，指出特兰德伦堡是从形式逻辑角度反驳康德立足于其经验实在性与先验观念性的时空观，从形式逻辑的角度驳斥康德时空观忽视了康德对确立人类知识有效性与合法性的愿景与不得不做出的逻辑牺牲，并由此展示康德时间概念的独特性。

Abstract: In this paper on the concept of time in Kant’s Transcendental Aesthetic, the first part will clarify the basic content of Kant’s concept of time and compare it with the concepts of time in Aristotle and Augustine. By elaborating on the unsolvable problem of the succession of innumerable minimal units of time in Aristotle’s view of time and the problem of the subjectivization of time in Augustine’s view of time, I will clarify that, in Kant’s concept of time as an a priori form of intuition, the problem of continuity does not arise under intuition—that is, as long as intuition is continuous, time as an a priori form of intuition functions synchronously. Furthermore, the a priori form of intuition differs from phenomena and is neither continuous nor discontinuous. Moreover, the empirical reality and transcendental ideality of time ensure that time possesses objectivity within subjectivity, thereby avoiding the problems of continuity and subjectivization inherent in the Aristotelian and Augustinian conceptions of time. In the second part, by introducing the famous refutation of Kant’s view of space and time in the history of philosophy—known as Trendelenburg’s gap—I will reconstruct Kant’s argument and attempt to reveal that Kant’s concept of time neglects the fact that the relation of presupposition is not equivalent to the relation of containment. Consequently, whether intuition can be derived from space and time cannot be established on the premise that space and time are the presuppositions of intuition. That is to say, the logical foundation of the intuitive nature of space and time is not secure; it is not self-evident. Intuition may indeed be derived from space and time, but the possibility that it is derived from something else cannot be ruled out. Finally, from the standpoint of defending Kant’s philosophy, I will argue that Trendelenburg’s critique of Kant’s view of space and time proceeds from the perspective of formal logic, whereas Kant’s position is grounded in his empirical reality and transcendental ideality. To refute Kant’s conception of space and time from a formal-logical standpoint overlooks Kant’s vision of establishing the validity and legitimacy of human knowledge and the logical sacrifices he was compelled to make. This, in turn, reveals the distinctiveness of Kant’s concept of time.