论引进控制股东信义义务的否定——美国法上控制股东制度起源的启示

Negation of Fiduciary Duty of Controlling Shareholders in China—Lessons from U.S. Legal Experience

摘要: 控制股东是公司治理的关键主体。部分学者主张引进美国普通法以“实用主义法官造法”为特征的控制股东信义义务，以约束控制权滥用。然而，该主张与我国公司法基本理论相悖，并不适应我国公司土壤。我国应当通过实质董事制度，在控制股东超越股东边界对公司进行实质性决策和管理时，承担类似董事的责任和义务，建立起一个既顺应法理逻辑、又有助于中小股东保护的控制权约束机制，在功能上替代控制股东信义义务的预设逻辑。

Abstract: Controlling shareholders are the key entities in corporate governance, and their influence on the company is significant, especially in small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), where controlling shareholders play a crucial role. Some scholars advocate the introduction of the fiduciary duty of controlling shareholders characterized by “pragmatic judge-made law” in the United States to constrain the abuse of control rights. However, this proposal contradicts the basic theory of China’s company law. Apart from explicitly excluding the theoretical obligation of controlling shareholders to bear fiduciary duties, the protection of small shareholders in China does not necessarily need to rely on the fiduciary duty of controlling shareholders. This dissertation argues that it can be achieved through the system of substantial directors, where controlling shareholders are required to take on similar responsibilities and obligations as directors when they make substantial decisions and manage the company beyond the shareholder boundaries. These systems establish a control mechanism for controlling rights that is in line with legal logic and helps protect the rights and interests of small shareholders, which functionally replaces the fiduciary duty of controlling shareholders.