布伦塔诺的心理实在论

On Brentano’s Mental Realism

摘要: 布伦塔诺在《从经验立场出发的心理学》中区别了相对真的物理现象与绝对真的心理现象。本文试图阐明布伦塔诺的心理实在论立场：只有心理现象才是实在的。一部分学者对布伦塔诺的实在论态度持有争议，认为心理现象不但具有意向关系，还具有其它可指向外在世界的关系。本文对于外在世界问题将着重考察两个文本，从中分析得出外在世界仅仅作为一种区分自然科学与心理学而做的权宜假设。故文章分为两部分，第一部分对心理现象与物理现象作出考察，从而初步的勾勒二者的特征，表明前者的实存性以及证明后者的虚假性。第二部分则考察布伦塔诺集中论及有关外在世界或真实之物的两处文本并对之进行分析，从而表明外在世界仅仅作为假设而被提出，对于科学研究无任何助益。

Abstract: Brentano distinguished the physical phenomenon and the psychological phenomenon in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, the former being relatively true and the latter absolutely true. This essay is meant to illustrate Brentano’s mental realism: only mental phenomenon is real. A number of scholars who hold dispute over such standpoint believe not only the intentional relation the mental phenomenon possesses but also other relations referring to external world it does possess. This essay is about to mainly focus on two texts from which the conclusion that external world merely exists as a hypothesis to distinguish the natural science and the science of psychology will be drawn. This article is divided into two parts, the first part being about the investigation of the two phenomena for illustrating their reality and non-reality respectively, and the second part meant to analyze the two mentioned texts and conclude that the external world is proposed as a hypothesis and contributes nothing to science.