大股东持股比例与分析师盈余预测偏差

Majority Shareholder Ownership and Analyst Surplus Forecast Deviation

摘要: 当大股东持股比例增加时，是增强对管理层的监督，披露高质量的信息，还是与其合谋来获得更多收益，从而隐藏企业真实的信息？不同类型的信息会影响分析师盈余预测。本文以2012~2022年沪深A股上市公司为样本，探讨大股东持股比例与分析师盈余预测偏差的关系。研究结果发现，随着大股东持股比例的增加，在公司治理层面发挥的积极作用会增强，有效保障企业披露财务信息的质量，分析师盈余预测偏差会减少。异质性检验发现，当企业的内部控制水平低、信息不透明和审计质量较低时，大股东持股比例与分析师盈余预测偏差的负相关关系越显著。本文从分析师预测视角丰富了大股东在公司治理中的作用，有利于公司信息质量的改善。

Abstract: With the increase of the share of major shareholders, will they strengthen the supervision of the management and disclose high-quality information, or will they conspire with them to obtain more profits and hide the real information of the company? Different types of information affect analysts’ surplus forecasts. This paper explores the relationship between the shareholding ratio of major shareholders and analysts’ surplus forecast bias using a sample of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2012 to 2022. The results find that as the proportion of majority shareholders’ ownership increases, the positive role played at the level of corporate governance will be enhanced, the quality of financial information disclosed by firms will be effectively safeguarded, and analysts’ surplus forecast bias will be reduced. The heterogeneity test shows that when the firm’s internal control level is low, the information is not transparent and the audit quality is low, the more significant the negative correlation between the proportion of majority shareholders’ ownership and analysts’ surplus forecast bias. This paper enriches the role of large shareholders in corporate governance from the analyst forecasting perspective, which is conducive to the improvement of corporate information quality.