碳税下考虑利他偏好的双渠道绿色供应链碳减排与定价决策研究

Research on Carbon Emission Reduction and Pricing Decision of Dual-Channel Green Supply Chain Considering Altruistic Preference under Carbon Tax

摘要: 建立由零售商和利他偏好制造商构成的两阶段双渠道绿色供应链，基于非线性消费者需求函数，构建政府有无碳税两种Stacklberg博弈模型，探讨碳税、利他偏好和渠道竞争对双渠道绿色供应链碳减排与定价决策的影响。最后设计考虑利他偏好的成本分担契约以最大限度减少碳排放，实现供应链成员双赢。研究表明，无论是否有碳税政策，制造商利他偏好有利于碳减排，提高零售商、供应链利润以及制造商效用，而渠道竞争的作用与利他偏好相反；碳税对供应链碳减排有积极作用，对渠道需求、供应链成员利润等有消极作用；成本分担契约能有效协调供应链，促进碳减排和提高供应链利润。

Abstract: A two-stage dual-channel green supply chain consisting of retailer and altruistic preference manufacturer was established. Based on nonlinear consumer demand function, two Stacklberg game models with or without government carbon tax are constructed to explore the effects of carbon tax, altruistic preference and channel competition on carbon emission reduction and pricing decisions of dual-channel green supply chain. Finally, a cost-sharing contract considering altruistic preference is designed to minimize carbon emissions and achieve a win-win situation for supply chain members. The results show that manufacturer’s altruism preference is beneficial to carbon emission reduction and increase the profits of retailer and supply chain and manufacturer’s utility, regardless of whether there is a carbon tax policy, while channel competition is opposite to altruism preference. Carbon tax has a positive effect on carbon emission reduction in supply chain, but has a negative effect on channel demand and supply chain members’ profits. Cost-sharing contract can effectively coordinate supply chain, promote carbon emission reduction and increase supply chain profit.