考虑政府补贴的季节性流感疫苗接种博弈研究

A Research on Seasonal Influenza Vaccination Game Considering Government Subsidies

摘要: 本文以季节性流感防治策略为研究对象，基于SVIR传播模型，构建了一个考虑政府补贴的疫苗接种博弈模型。基于人群对疫苗接种的期望支付，选取了三种策略更新方法，并通过仿真模拟，分析了不同更新机制下政府补贴、疫苗有效性以及接种率之间关系。研究结果表明：无论是否有政府补贴，不同策略更新方法下的接种率都随着相对接种成本的增加而减少；但有政府补贴时，可以显著提高接种率。同时，从社会效益角度看，政府补贴却并非越多越好，在疫苗有效性不高时，政府补贴带来的高接种率，反而会导致社会总支出的增加；在疫苗有效性较高且人群采用全局更新方法时，政府只需适度补贴，就可以达到降低感染人数和减少社会总支出的目标。

Abstract: This paper focuses on the prevention and control strategies for seasonal influenza, constructing a vaccination game model considering government subsidies based on the SVIR transmission model. The model selects three strategy update methods based on the population’s expected payment for vaccination and analyzes the relationship between government subsidies, vaccine effectiveness, and vaccination rates under different update mechanisms through simulation. The results indicate that vaccination rates decrease with the increase of relative vaccination costs under different strategy update methods, regardless of government subsidies; however, government subsidies can significantly increase vaccination rates. From a social welfare perspective, government subsidies are not necessarily the more, the better. When vaccine effectiveness is low, high vaccination rates brought about by government subsidies can lead to increased total social expenditure. When vaccine effectiveness is high and the population adopts a global update method, the government only needs to provide moderate subsidies to achieve the goal of reducing the number of infections and decreasing total social expenditure.