考虑质量分级的易腐产品物流模式决策研究

Research on Decision Making of Perishable Products Logistics Model Considering Quality Grading

摘要: 本文基于电商平台自建物流体系的情况，建立一个涵盖制造商、平台和第三方物流的博弈论模型，深入探讨了在竞争激烈的物流服务市场背景下，易腐产品制造商如何在考虑产品质量分级、物流服务水平等因素时选择最佳的物流模式策略。本文采用Stackelberg博弈模型，进行优化求解，研究发现：1) 对于普通易腐产品而言，当竞争物流服务水平的溢出效应较低或较高时，提升产品质量可能反而减少其定价和市场需求。2) 在消费者对物流服务质量不敏感的情况下，制造商与平台物流合作可能更具竞争优势。相反，当消费者对物流服务质量敏感时，制造商与第三方物流公司合作可能更为有利。3) 物流服务水平的溢出效应对成本和利润分配有显著影响。在混合渠道下，当第三方物流服务优于平台时，制造商能够获得更大的利润；而平台物流服务优于第三方时，则能增加平台的利润。

Abstract: Based on the self-built logistics system of e-commerce platforms, this paper establishes a game theory model covering manufacturers, platforms, and third-party logistics, and discusses in depth how manufacturers of perishable products can choose the optimal logistics model strategy when considering product quality grading, logistics service level and other factors in the context of a highly competitive logistics service market. This paper adopts the Stackelberg game model conducts optimization solving, and finds that: 1) For ordinary perishable products, when the spillover effect of the competitive logistics service level is low or high, improving the product quality may, on the contrary, reducing its pricing and market demand. 2) When consumers are not sensitive to logistics service quality, manufacturers may have a competitive advantage in cooperating with platform logistics. On the contrary, when consumers are sensitive to logistics service quality, manufacturers may prefer to cooperate with 3PLs. 3) The spillover effect of the logistics service level significantly impacts cost and profit distribution. Under the mixed channel, manufacturers are able to gain greater profits when third-party logistics services are superior to platforms, while platform logistics services increase platform profits when they are superior to third parties.