政府奖惩激励机制下建筑企业碳排放监管的三方演化博弈分析

The Triangular Evolutionary Game Analysis of Carbon Emission Supervision in Construction Enterprises under Government Incentive Mechanism

摘要: 随着全球气候问题的日益严重，碳排放监管已成为国际社会共同关注的焦点。二氧化碳的大量排放不仅导致全球变暖和各种极端天气事件频发，也对人类社会的可持续发展构成了严重威胁。在这种背景下，本研究聚焦于政府奖惩激励机制下建筑企业碳排放监管的三方演化博弈分析。通过构建涵盖政府、建筑企业和碳排放监测机构三方的演化博弈模型，探讨不同策略组合对碳排放监管效果的影响。研究结果表明，政府采取强监管策略，结合显著的激励机制，能够有效促进建筑企业采取积极减排策略，同时激励碳排放监测机构提升监测能力，形成良性的三方互动。相比之下，政府若采取弱监管策略，将导致建筑企业倾向于消极减排，监测机构也缺乏提升监测能力的动力，从而不利于碳排放的有效控制。

Abstract: As global climate issues become increasingly severe, carbon emission regulation has become a focal point of common concern for the international community. The massive emission of carbon dioxide not only leads to global warming and the frequent occurrence of various extreme weather events but also poses a serious threat to the sustainable development of human society. In this context, this study focuses on the triangular evolutionary game analysis of carbon emission supervision in construction enterprises under government incentive mechanisms. By constructing an evolutionary game model that includes the government, construction enterprises, and carbon emission monitoring institutions, the study explores the impact of different strategy combinations on the effectiveness of carbon emission supervision. The research findings indicate that when the government adopts a strong regulatory strategy combined with a significant incentive mechanism, it can effectively encourage construction enterprises to adopt proactive emission reduction strategies and motivate carbon emission monitoring institutions to enhance their monitoring capabilities, forming a positive interaction among the three parties. In contrast, if the government adopts a weak regulatory strategy, it will lead construction enterprises to tend towards passive emission reduction, and monitoring institutions will lack the motivation to improve their monitoring capabilities, which is not conducive to the effective control of carbon emissions.