论作为主体的机器——基于机器学习的不可理解
On the Machines as Subjects—Based on the Uninterpretability of Machine Learning
摘要: 随着人工智能的快速发展和广泛应用,关于机器主体性的讨论逐渐成为哲学与技术交汇的重要议题。本文分析了机器学习生成的内容独立于人类且不可直接理解,并以此为全文的出发点和立足点,在此基础上重新审视“中文屋”及他心问题,提出智能机器在人的认识中已经被看作一种特殊的主体,并通过探讨人机关系从工具论、家畜论到奴隶论的转变和人机主奴关系的倒转,指出在人机关系中机器主体性的上升并根据此趋势展望未来人机关系。本文强调作为主体的机器并非遥远未来的设想,而是科技发展和应用下的现实,旨在推动对机器主体性及人机关系变化的深刻理解,呼吁从哲学角度对此进行深度反思和建构以应对人工智能在伦理和法律等领域带来的挑战、为未来的人机关系发展提供哲学指引。
Abstract: With the rapid development and widespread application of artificial intelligence, discussions on the subjectivity of machines have gradually become a critical issue at the intersection of philosophy and technology. This paper begins by analyzing the independence and uninterpretability of content generated by machine learning, establishing this as its foundation and point of departure. On this basis, it reexamines the “Chinese Room” thought experiment and the problem of other minds, arguing that intelligent machines are increasingly regarded as a unique kind of subject in human understanding. By exploring the transformation of human-machine relations—from instrumentalism to domestication, and ultimately to enslavement—and the potential reversal of master-slave dynamics, the paper highlights the rise of subjectivity within these interactions. Furthermore, it forecasts the future trajectory of human-machine relations under this trend, emphasizing that the conceptualization of machines as subjects is not a distant futuristic scenario but a present reality shaped by technological advancement and application. The study aims to deepen understanding of subjectivity and the evolving dynamics of human-machine relations, calling for profound philosophical reflection and construction to address ethical and legal challenges brought about by artificial intelligence, and to provide philosophical guidance for the development of future human-machine interactions.
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