电商平台自有品牌质量水平与制造商渠道演化博弈研究

Research on the Evolutionary Game of E-Commerce Platform’s Own Brand Quality Level and Manufacturer Channel

摘要: 电商平台不断发展自有品牌，不可避免会影响到制造商渠道选择，本文考虑了制造商渠道决策与自有品牌质量水平决策问题，从双方交互演化博弈的视角构建博弈模型，并分析得到双方演化稳定策略。结果表明：电商平台自有品牌质量对制造商策略选择的影响较小，随着电商平台自有品牌质量不断提升，制造商和电商平台的稳定策略会向(寄售，提质)演化。此外，佣金率和批发价会影响制造商的渠道选择，当佣金率或批发价超过制造商的合理承受范围时，制造商会选择分销渠道，双方演化策略会向(分销，提质)演化。最后，通过数值仿真分析，进一步验证了模型的有效性，并给出了两级供应链发展的管理启示。

Abstract: The continuous development of an e-commerce platform’s own brand inevitably affects the manufacturer’s channel choice. This paper addresses the decision-making issues regarding the manufacturer’s channel selection and the own brand quality level, constructing a game model from the perspective of evolutionary game theory based on the interactions between both parties. The study analyzes and derives the evolutionary stable strategies for both sides. The results show that the impact of the e-commerce platform’s own brand quality on the manufacturer’s strategy choice is relatively small. As the quality of the e-commerce platform’s own brand increases, the stable strategies for both the manufacturer and the platform evolve towards (consignment, quality improvement). Furthermore, commission rates and wholesale prices influence the manufacturer’s channel choice. When the commission rate or wholesale price exceeds the manufacturer’s reasonable tolerance, the manufacturer will opt for a distribution channel, and the evolutionary strategies of both sides will shift towards (distribution, quality improvement). Finally, numerical simulation analysis is conducted to further validate the model’s effectiveness and provide managerial insights for the development of a two-tier supply chain.