基于PT-MA理论的高速铁路施工工人质量行为演化研究
Evolutionary Analysis of Quality Behavior of High-Speed Railway Construction Workers Based on PT-MA Theory
摘要: 高速铁路施工工人和施工单位质量管理人员的策略选择直接影响到高速铁路工程项目的施工质量。本文从前景理论和心理账户理论的角度出发,分析了施工单位质量管理人员和高速铁路施工工人的策略选择过程。通过构建成本账户和效价账户前景收益感知矩阵,深入分析了博弈双方行为决策的动态演化过程,探讨了不同情形下演化系统达到均衡状态需要满足的条件,解释了实际施工过程中系统策略演化不能达到理想状态的原因,并利用MATLAB软件对相关影响因素进行了仿真分析。研究表明:高速铁路施工工人质量行为受到多因素的影响,提高高速铁路施工工人的效价风险偏好系数、减小成本损失风险偏好系数以及降低质量合规行为成本有利于高速铁路施工工人行为策略向“质量合规行为”策略演化;提高施工单位质量管理人员选择积极管理策略的初始比例、降低积极管理成本、适当的奖励和处罚有利于高速铁路施工工人行为策略向“质量合规行为”策略演化。
Abstract: The strategic choices of high-speed railway construction workers and quality management personnel directly impact the construction quality of high-speed railway projects. This study analyzes the decision-making process of the quality management personnel and the construction workers from the perspectives of Prospect Theory and Mental Accounting Theory. By constructing matrices of perceived gains for cost accounts and value accounts, this research delves into the dynamic evolution of decision-making behaviors of both parties in the game, explores the conditions required for the evolutionary system to reach an equilibrium state under different scenarios, and explains the reasons why the system’s strategic evolution fails to achieve an ideal state in the actual construction process. MATLAB software is utilized to conduct simulations on relevant influencing factors. The research indicates that the quality behavior of high-speed railway construction workers is influenced by multiple factors. Increasing the utility risk preference coefficient of high-speed railway construction workers, reducing the cost loss risk preference coefficient, and reducing the cost of quality compliance behavior are conducive to the evolution of the workers’ behavioral strategies towards quality compliance behavior. Additionally, raising the initial proportion of proactive management strategies chosen by the quality management personnel, decreasing the costs associated with proactive management, and implementing appropriate rewards and penalties are beneficial for the evolution of the construction workers’ behavioral strategies towards quality compliance behavior.
文章引用:刘家惠. 基于PT-MA理论的高速铁路施工工人质量行为演化研究[J]. 运筹与模糊学, 2025, 15(2): 562-578. https://doi.org/10.12677/orf.2025.152106

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