颜色的实在论辩护论析

An Exploration into the Defense for Color Realism

摘要: 解释鸿沟有主观与客观之分，着力于消除主观解释鸿沟，必须解释个体如何形成其颜色观念。朴素实在论将颜色视为物体固有的性质，肯定其心灵独立性，给出一个消除解释鸿沟的方向。而按照伽利略式唯名论，颜色只存在于意识之中，朴素实在论不能解释知觉的人际差异、内在差异和物种差异，且忽视意识的“一般问题”，无法弥合解释鸿沟。但是，伽利略式唯名论并不构成对朴素实在论的致命威胁，它将颜色视为意识投射的结果缺乏科学理论的支撑。从颜色的光学解释和量子理论对意识问题的揭示来看，朴素实在论仍是一个值得坚持的方向。肯定意识的是在为朴素实在论辩护，由此回应关于颜色和意识的解释鸿沟问题，需进一步综合哲学与物理学前沿的研究。

Abstract: The explanatory gap can be divided into subjective version and objective version. Naïve realism works to bridge the subjective explanatory gap to explain color, and the key is find out how individuals go through a mental process to form ideas about color. Naïve realism treats color as a property of the physical entity itself, affirming its mind-independent and giving a direction to dissolve the explanatory gap. According to Galilean nominalism, “secondary quality”, including color, exists only in consciousness. And thinking naïve realism not only fails to give color a solid ontological foundation and explain the intra-personal variation, inter-personal variation, and inter-species variation, but also neglects the “general question” of consciousness so that fails to bridge the explanatory gap. However, Galilean nominalism does not pose a mortal threat to naïve realism, and its view of color as the result of conscious projection lacks the support of scientific theory. In terms of the optical explanation of color and the revelation of the problem of consciousness by quantum theory, naïve realism is still a theoretical direction worth adhering to. Investing in the affirmation of the reality of consciousness in defense of naïve realism, and the resulting response to the explanatory gap about color and consciousness, requires further research that integrates the frontiers of philosophy and physics.