认罪认罚从宽制度中的控辩关系研究

A Study on Prosecution and Defense Relationship in the System of Leniency for Guilty Plea

摘要: 作为“审判中心主义”诉讼制度改革的配套制度，认罪认罚从宽制度融入了“协商性司法”这一国际通行的现代司法理念。虽然目前在认罪认罚案件中，控辩双方进行诉讼合作的现象较为常见，但在司法实践中，诸如“检察机关主导模式”的存在、双方在取证能力上的差异、辩护效果的不充分以及考核评价体系对效率的追求等因素，都可能隐含着控辩双方力量失衡的潜在风险。控辩失衡将无法保证审前合意的真实性，并使以控辩合意为基础的一系列制度设计显得不合理，同时也会加剧“一般应当采纳”的隐患。控辩平衡的实现离不开对控辩平等地位的追求、律师的实质帮助、控辩主体的协商以及审判机关的司法审查的保障。

Abstract: As a supporting mechanism for the litigation system reform centered on the “trial-centered doctrine”, the leniency system for guilty pleas and acceptance of punishments incorporates the modern judicial concept of “negotiated justice” commonly adopted in international judicial practice. Although procedural cooperation between the prosecution and defense has become relatively prevalent in cases involving guilty pleas and punishment acceptance, practical judicial operations reveal potential risks of power imbalance between the two parties. These risks stem from factors including the persistence of a “prosecutorial dominance model”, disparities in evidence-gathering capabilities, inadequate defense effectiveness, and efficiency-driven performance evaluation systems. Such prosecutorial-defense imbalance jeopardizes the authenticity of pre-trial agreements, renders institutional designs based on prosecution-defense consensus potentially unreasonable, and exacerbates latent issues surrounding the “general presumption of judicial adoption” of plea agreements. The realization of prosecutorial-defense equilibrium requires comprehensive safeguards encompassing the pursuit of equal status between parties, substantive legal assistance from defense counsel, genuine prosecutorial-defense negotiations, and rigorous judicial review by courts.