“是”与“实存”——论海德格尔对于Sein的追问

“Being” and “Existence”—On Heidegger’s Inquiry into Sein

摘要: 本文分析了海德格尔在《现象学之基本问题》一书运用现象学方法对康德哲学中“Sein”论题的追问以及对该论题的独到阐释，海德格尔在康德的基础上，进一步深化了对“是”与“存在”的二重区分，由此引入其有关存在本身的追问，并延续其在《存在与时间》中对于“此在”和“存在”的关系理解，从而瓦解了传统形而上学的方法，重构了存在论。

Abstract: This article analyzes Heidegger’s inquiry into the “Sein” topic in Kant’s philosophy by using the phenomenological method in his book “Fundamental Questions of Phenomenology”, as well as his unique interpretation of this topic. On the basis of Kant, Heidegger further deepened the double distinction between “being” and “being”, thereby introducing his inquiry into being itself. And it continues its understanding of the relationship between “Dasein” and “being” in “Being and Time”, thereby disintegrating the traditional metaphysical methods and reconstructing ontology.