结构实在论是否需要新康德主义视角？

Does Structural Realism Require a Neo-Kantian Perspective?

摘要: 结构实在论作为一种科学哲学的主张被约翰·沃勒尔(John Worrall)首次明确提出，其目的是为调和科学实在论与反实在论的长期争论，沃勒尔的方案主要针对“无奇迹论证”(no miracle argument)和“悲观元归纳”(pessimistic meta-induction)这两个分别从属于科学实在论与反实在论立场的核心论证。沃勒尔版本的结构实在论是一种认识论主张，事实上是对科学实在论的本体论承诺的辩护而非彻底的修正，因此弗伦奇(French)和雷迪曼(Ladyman)认为这种纯粹的认识论形式的结构实在论与标准的科学实在论一样无法解决科学理论变革过程中的本体论不连续性问题，他们主张一种本体论形式的结构实在论。米凯拉·马西米(Michela Massimi)通过对两种形式的结构实在论以及它们不同的理论来源进行分析后提出用一种新康德主义视角来重构结构实在论的理论要求与目的，以试图为这之间的争论提供新的方向。

Abstract: Structural realism, as a proposition in the philosophy of science, was first explicitly articulated by John Worrall, whose aim was to reconcile the longstanding debate between scientific realism and anti-realism. Worrall’s proposal primarily addresses the core arguments associated with scientific realism and anti-realism, namely the “no miracle argument” and “pessimistic meta-induction”. Worrall’s version of structural realism constitutes an epistemological claim that serves as a defense of the ontological commitments of scientific realism rather than a thorough revision. Consequently, French and Ladyman argue that this purely epistemological form of structural realism fails to resolve the issue of ontological discontinuity that arises during the process of scientific theory change, advocating instead for a form of ontological structural realism. Michela Massimi, by analyzing the two forms of structural realism and their differing theoretical origins, proposes a reconstruction of the theoretical demands and objectives of structural realism from a neo-Kantian perspective, seeking to provide new directions for this ongoing debate.