论主债权诉讼时效届满后抵押权的效力状态

On the Validity Status of Mortgage Rights after the Expiration of the Limitation Period for the Principal Claim

摘要: 《民法典》第419条和《担保制度解释》第44条均未明确主债权诉讼时效届满后抵押权的效力状态。抵押权的行使期间并不具有独立性，只是在时间上与主债权诉讼时效期间进行锚定，是抵押权从属性的体现。除斥期间说和诉讼时效说不符合抵押权的物权属性，失权期间说亦没有强行引入的必要。在主债权罹于诉讼时效后，抵押权的效力状态仍然存续，仅在公力救济的强制执行力上受损。抵押权行使过程中的请求属性和类推适用保证的时效抗辩权从属规定，可以证明抵押人获得时效抗辩权。抵押权登记的本质在于对抗第三人，故抵押人可基于抵押权不再具有对抗第三人的效力而主张注销登记。

Abstract: Neither Article 419 of the Civil Code nor Article 44 of the Judicial Interpretation on the Security Interest System explicitly clarifies the validity status of the mortgage right after the statute of limitations for the principal claim has expired. The exercise period of the mortgage right is not independent; it is only anchored in time to the limitation period of the principal claim, which embodies the accessory nature of the mortgage right. The theory of the exclusion period and the theory of the limitation period are inconsistent with the real right attribute of the mortgage right, and there is no need to forcibly introduce the theory of the right-extinguishing period. After the statute of limitations for the principal claim has lapsed, the validity of the mortgage right still subsists, with only the enforce-ability of judicial remedies impaired. The claim-oriented nature of the mortgage right in the process of its exercise and the analogous application of the accessory provisions on the statute of limitations defense right for guarantees can prove that the mortgagor is entitled to the limitation defense right. The essence of mortgage registration lies in opposing third parties; thus, the mortgagor may claim cancellation of the registration on the ground that the mortgage right no longer has the effect of opposing third parties.