监管新规背景下直播电商先行赔付机制与在线争议解决的治理效应研究

Governance Effects of Advance Compensation and Online Dispute Resolution in Live E-Commerce under New Regulations

摘要: 直播电商降低了搜索与匹配成本，但商品质量、履约与售后等属性事后可验证性强，信息不对称易诱发夸大宣传、货不对板等违规并推高纠纷与治理成本。基于《直播电商监督管理办法》，本文构建平台–商家–消费者三方演化博弈模型，将先行赔付表述为赔付兑现与平台兜底责任上升，将在线争议解决表述为维权成本下降，在复制动态框架下推导稳定条件并开展仿真。结果表明：仅降低维权成本难以形成合规稳态；先行赔付可强化平台治理并提升商家合规；二者联动更易形成“维权–治理–合规”的正向反馈，推动生态长期稳定。

Abstract: Live e-commerce reduces search and matching costs, yet strong post-purchase verifiability of product quality, fulfillment, and after-sales service intensifies information asymmetry, encouraging misconduct and increasing disputes and governance costs. Based on the Measures for the Supervision and Administration of Live E-Commerce, this study develops a tripartite evolutionary game model of platforms, merchants, and consumers. Advance compensation is modeled as higher compensation certainty and platform liability, while online dispute resolution is modeled as lower rights-protection costs. Replicator dynamics and simulations show that lowering rights-protection costs alone cannot ensure a stable compliance equilibrium; advance compensation enhances platform governance and merchant compliance; and their joint implementation fosters a “rights protection-governance-compliance” feedback loop, improving long-term ecosystem stability.