为什么康德不是道德实在论者？——对自律的研究
Why Is Not Kant a Moral Realist?—A Study of Autonomy
DOI: 10.12677/acpp.2026.152094, PDF,   
作者: 李晓斌：上海师范大学哲学与法政学院，上海
关键词: 自律；构成论诠释；实在论诠释；Autonomy； Constitutivism Interpretation； Realism Interpretation
摘要: 康德的自律概念为其伦理学之要害，但学者就其解读缺乏共识，并分为了构成论诠释与实在论诠释两大阵营。针对对手立场，实在论诠释的支持者提出了诸多批评。其中部分指责瞄准以下两点：构成论诠释的自律概念的自洽性，以及道德法则的优先性是否包含形而上学维度。但是，如果细致考察先天道德知识的可能性问题，就会发觉康德的实践哲学与理论哲学相一致，两者都要求放弃先验实在论。这必然使康德的伦理学成为一种构成论的伦理学。
Abstract: Kant’s concept of autonomy is the core of his ethics, but scholars remain divided over its interpretation and are divided into two camps: the constitutivism interpretation and the realism interpretation. Regarding the rival position, advocates of the realism interpretation have advanced a series of criticisms. Several of these objections center on two questions: first, the coherence of the constitutivism account of autonomy; second, whether the priority of the Moral law entails a metaphysical dimension. Nevertheless, a careful analysis of the possibility of a priori moral knowledge demonstrates that Kant’s practical philosophy is in lines with theoretical philosophy, insofar as both demand the repudiation of transcendental realism, which necessarily commits Kant’s ethics to a constitutivism ethics.
文章引用：李晓斌. 为什么康德不是道德实在论者？——对自律的研究[J]. 哲学进展, 2026, 15(2): 383-388. https://doi.org/10.12677/acpp.2026.152094

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