政府监管对竞争供应链下漂绿策略的影响研究

The Impact of Government Regulation on Greenwashing Strategies in Competitive Supply Chain

摘要: 在全球绿色发展持续深化的背景下，厂商积极实施可持续的绿色实践，然而一些厂商为避免高额的绿色成本，采用漂绿策略夸大其产品和服务的绿色水平，以获取不正当竞争优势。本文旨在分析绿色市场中的厂商在绿色策略与漂绿策略之间的均衡决策，并为政府规范绿色市场中的漂绿策略提供管理见解。本文构建了一个由两个厂商和一个供应商组成的二级供应链模型。两个厂商销售同质产品并自行决定自己的绿色/绿漂策略。研究发现，为了有效打击漂绿策略并确保绿色策略的可行性和可持续性，仅增加处罚力度并不能有效消除厂商的绿漂行为。政府应在不同水平的漂绿处罚和绿色成本下采取不同的监管措施。具体而言，在低处罚低成本的区域，应适当降低处罚力度；在高处罚高成本的区域，应加大处罚力度；在高处罚低成本的区域，除了加大漂绿处罚力度外，还应提高绿色成本；在低处罚高成本的区域，降低处罚的同时减少绿色成本。此外，研究还表明，政府需从综合管理的视角出发，整合处罚概率与处罚成本的政策工具，才能有效遏制漂绿策略的选择。

Abstract: In the context of the continuous deepening of global green development, manufacturers are actively implementing sustainable green practices. However, in order to avoid high costs, some manufacturers exaggerate the green level of their products and services to gain unfair competitive advantages, that is, adopt greenwash strategy. Due to the unclear green violation penalty policy, manufacturers believe that the risk of greenwashing is low and are more inclined to adopt greenwash strategy, which further exacerbates this problem. This paper aims to analyze the equilibrium decision between green strategy and greenwash strategy of manufacturers in the green market, offering insights for government regulation. A two-tier supply chain model with two retailers and one supplier is constructed. The study finds that merely increasing penalties is not effective. Instead, the government should vary regulatory intensity based on the level of greenwash penalties and green costs. In low-penalty and low-cost area, penalties should be reduced. In high-penalty and high-cost area, penalties should be increased. In high-penalty and low-cost area, both penalties and green costs should be increased. In low-penalty and high-cost area, both penalties and green costs should be reduced. Additionally, this paper indicates that the government needs to adopt an integrated management perspective, combining the policy tools of penalty probability and penalty costs to effectively curb greenwashing.