数字服务电商供应链中的渠道入侵与定价策略研究——基于生成式AI产业的博弈模型分析

Research on Channel Encroachment and Pricing Strategies in Digital Service E-Commerce Supply Chains—A Game-Theoretic Analysis Based on the Generative AI Industry

摘要: 针对生成式AI供应链中基础模型供应商的功能性入侵问题，本文构建Stackelberg博弈模型，探究下游电子零售商构建私有化壁垒的防御有效性。研究发现：(1) 入侵并非总是导致零和博弈，在低服务替代率与高技术效率条件下，双重边际化消除效应占主导，供应链可实现利润的帕累托改进；(2) 私有化壁垒具有显著的入侵威慑效应，能降低供应商的入侵意愿，从而在特定战略区间内成功迫使供应商放弃入侵。结论表明，构建私有化数据壁垒是下游企业应对上游双重挤压、实现生存与共赢的占优策略。

Abstract: Addressing the functional encroachment by foundation model suppliers in the Generative AI supply chain, this paper develops a Stackelberg game model to examine the defensive efficacy of private barriers built by downstream e-tailers. We find that: (1) Encroachment is not necessarily a zero-sum game; a Pareto improvement zone exists under conditions of low service substitutability and high technical efficiency, driven by the elimination of double marginalization. (2) Private barriers generate a significant Encroachment Deterrence Effect, lowering the supplier’s invasion incentive and effectively deterring entry in specific strategic zones. The results suggest that constructing private data barriers is the dominant strategy for e-tailers to survive and arguably thrive under the supplier’s dual squeeze.