考虑强制回收与补贴的电商服装CLSC回收决策
Recycling Decision in E-Commerce Apparel CLSC under Mandatory Recycling and Subsidy Policies
摘要: 针对现在废旧衣物污染严重、回收率低的问题,尤其是在电子商务迅速崛起、线上服装消费激增的背景下,本文旨在比较有无强制回收和补贴政策时服装闭环供应链的回收情况和政策影响,给衣物回收政策研究提供一些参考。基于一个包含服装生产商、线上商家、消费者及政府组成的闭环供应链系统,构建分散决策和集中决策模型、引入契约协调,探讨该闭环供应链的回收定价决策,并比较不同补贴模式的优劣。研究表明,无论逆向物流成本高低,均满足:集中决策时废旧衣物回收率更高,此时在正向供应链引入批发价格折扣契约能够实现闭环供应链的协调;政府设置回收率目标并提供回收补贴有助于保证废旧衣物回收率,同时防止供应链的利润受到损害,政府补贴针对服装生产商时支出更少,执行效率更高。
Abstract: In response to the current issues of severe pollution and low recycling rates associated with used clothing, particularly against the backdrop of the rapid rise of e-commerce and the surge in online apparel consumption, this study aims to compare the recycling performance and policy impacts within the apparel closed-loop supply chain under scenarios with and without mandatory recycling and subsidy policies, thereby providing insights for clothing recycling policy research. Based on a closed-loop supply chain system comprising one apparel manufacturer, one online merchant, consumers, and the government, this study constructs decentralized and centralized decision-making models and introduces contract coordination to explore recycling pricing decisions within this closed-loop supply chain, while comparing the strengths and weaknesses of different subsidy models. Research indicates that, regardless of the level of reverse logistics costs, the following holds true: the used clothing recycling rate is higher under centralized decision-making, where introducing a wholesale price discount contract in the forward supply chain can achieve coordination among all members. Government setting recycling rate targets and providing recycling subsidies helps ensure the recycling rate of used clothing while preventing damage to supply chain profits. Under this policy, government subsidy expenditures directed at apparel manufacturers are lower, and execution efficiency is higher.
文章引用:袁圆. 考虑强制回收与补贴的电商服装CLSC回收决策[J]. 电子商务评论, 2026, 15(3): 209-218. https://doi.org/10.12677/ecl.2026.153265

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