系统性风险下的电商平台订单准入均衡与社会福利：基于双服务商排队模型研究

Order Admission Equilibrium and Social Welfare for E-Commerce Platforms under Systemic Risk: A Study Based on a Dual-Server Queuing Model

摘要: 本文从排队论视角出发，构建了电商平台在系统性风险下的订单准入排队模型，重点研究双渠道服务同时中断场景下的订单准入均衡策略与社会福利。模型假设电商平台信息透明且订单持续到达，分析了订单到达决策者在个体理性下形成的纳什均衡准入行为，并进一步探讨了电商平台在全局最优阈值策略下的系统稳态拥堵水平与社会福利函数。通过解析推导与数值模拟，揭示了不同需求强度与风险参数组合下均衡的动态特征，以及供应渠道恢复率、停止服务率等关键运营参数对社会福利的影响机制。本研究为电商平台在应对系统性风险时的双渠道协同管理、订单准入策略制定以及社会福利优化提供了理论依据与决策参考。

Abstract: From the perspective of queueing theory, this paper constructs an order admission queueing model for an e-commerce platform’s dual channels under systemic risk, and studies the equilibrium order admission strategy and social welfare when both supply channels of the platform may simultaneously stop providing services. The model assumes that the e-commerce platform operates with transparent information and continuous order arrivals, analyzes the Nash equilibrium admission behavior formed by order-arriving decision-makers under individual rationality, and further explores the steady-state congestion level and social welfare function of the system under the platform’s globally optimal threshold strategy. Through analytical derivation and numerical simulations, the dynamic characteristics of equilibrium under different combinations of demand intensity and risk parameters are revealed, as well as the impact mechanisms of key operational parameters such as service recovery rate and service interruption rate on social welfare. This study provides theoretical foundations and decision-making references for e-commerce platforms in coordinating dual channels, formulating order admission strategies, and optimizing social welfare when responding to systemic risks.